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Abstract 
The advent of the so-called Companion Robots is raising 
many ethical concerns among scholars and in the public 
opinion. Focusing mainly on robots caring for the elderly, in 
this paper we analyze these concerns to distinguish which 
are directly ascribable to robotic, and which are instead pre-
existent. One of these is the “deception objection”, namely 
the ethical unacceptability of deceiving the user about the 
simulated nature of the robot’s behaviors. We argue on the 
inconsistency of this charge, as today formulated. After that, 
we underline the risk, for human-robot interaction, to be-
come a hallucinatory relation where the human would sub-
jectify the robot in a dynamic of meaning-overload. Finally, 
we analyze the definition of “quasi-other” relating to the no-
tion of “uncanny”. The goal of this paper is to argue that the 
main concern about Companion Robots is the simulation of 
a human-like interaction in the absence of an autonomous 
robotic horizon of meaning. In addition, that absence could 
lead the human to build a hallucinatory reality based on the 
relation with the robot.   
 Five Ethical Concerns for Companion Robots   
In recent years, advances in the field of robotics have led to 
a great expectation of what we call Companion Robots, 
namely machines that are designed and specifically pro-
grammed to produce a physic, linguistic and in some 
measure also emotional interaction with human beings. 
The main goal of these machines is often the care of chil-
dren, elderly, people with disabilities. In addition to a gen-
eral skepticism about the possibility of a positive reaction 
of public opinion to the introduction of such machines into 
everyday life (Coeckelbergh et al. 2016), other ethical con-
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cerns have been raised. The questions posed by the human-
robot interaction highlight the ethically correct modalities 
of this relation. They also raise ancient problems of philos-
ophy in the field of robotics. In this first section we high-
light the five main ethical concerns for Companion Robot 
(CR). In the second section we discuss the “deception ob-
jection”, arguing that this ethical concern is based on a 
false opposition between human-human and human-robot 
interactions. Then, we argue that a risk for human-robot 
interaction is to become hallucinatory for humans. In the 
third section we analyze the definition of CRs as “quasi-
others” in relation to the notion of “uncanny” in Freud 
(1919). 
From the various scientific articles that discuss the future 
use of CRs, one can extrapolate five major criticisms or 
perplexities concerning scholars (Sharkey 2012). We will 
summarize and comment on these main topics. Attention 
will be given to the deception accusation, which will be 
reformulated from a different view of intersubjective rela-
tions. These five points specifically refer to robots for the 
care of the elderly, but are easily extendable to any CR. It 
is necessary, in commenting on these five most critical 
points, to distinguish between the undesirable consequenc-
es derived from CRs directly, and the unwanted conse-
quences, where CRs are to be considered solely the inci-
dental cause that triggers a deeper root cause. When dis-
cussing the effects of "Robotic Invasion", one should con-
sider the difference between the changes that robotic caus-
es suo motu and those that were already present within our 
time as tendencies, social or individual, that robotics helps 
to manifest. This distinction makes no less relevant the dis-
cussion on how to minimize the impact that robots might 
have on social, cultural, and political processes already in 
place, a central issue for the success in the robot’s inclu-
sion in millions of people everyday life. But a greater theo-
retical depth is needed to understand the different values of 
human life changes that the machine will bring in the com-
ing years. The five major concerns are: 
1) The potential reduction of human contact: the likely 
progressive loss of interaction with other human beings of 
those who will be subject to robot-caring. 
2) An increase in the sensation of objectification: robot 
care could increase the sensation of loss of active subjec-
tivity. 
3) A loss of privacy due to constant monitoring. 
4) Loss of personal freedom. 
5) Deception and infantilization: the creation of robots with 
the ability to simulate mental states, to interact verbally 
(and not) with humans, to understand and respond to their 
emotional states, raises the question of whether it is legiti-
mate to deceive human subjects on the simulated nature of 
intersubjective robotic interaction. Moreover, an interac-
tion only with robots could lead the subject to a state of 
infantilization. 
According to the distinction made between the direct and 
indirect consequences on these objections to robotics, we 
believe that points 1,3 and 4 can be attributed to the first 
group of problems raised by robots, namely those that do 
not specifically address the nature of CRs behavior, but 
derive from an extension to the machine of socio-cultural 
problems already present in our societies. 
1) The potential reduction of human contact is not a conse-
quence of the CRs, but is caused by the general indiffer-
ence that the young and adult sections of the population 
feel towards the elderly, who are already marginalized in 
closed environments such as nursing homes for the elderly, 
with a minimal interaction with the rest of the world, fun-
damentally limited to the staff of the facility. It is reported 
by Kanamori (2002), that interaction with the robot stimu-
lates the sociality of elderly. The loneliness of seniors, 
abandoned by relatives, is a process of social and genera-
tional nature that has little to do with ethical problems of 
robotic. 
3) Also the loss of privacy is a problem that most of the 
existing technologies already pose to the user: computers, 
smart phones, smart homes, any environment monitoring 
tool, pacemakers. This, of course, does not reduce the criti-
cal importance of the privacy issue, but we do not consider 
this as a specific problem of robotics, since CRs do not 
bring any significant changes to the existing privacy ques-
tion, but they represent only a further field of application. 
4) Likewise, the loss of personal liberty equally affects ro-
botics and human caring. Both the issue of privacy and 
freedom are raised with repeated insistence not because 
they are actually a novelty in the condition of elderly, but 
because the fact that these problems are raised by robots 
creates in the public opinion a stronger reaction, resulting 
solely from mistrust and a great suspicion in the robotics. 
This negative feeling of robotics has been detected in 60% 
of Europeans, who are deeply opposed to CRs (Coeckel-
bergh et al. 2016). Obviously, the problem of social per-
ception of the CRs phenomenon is not a secondary issue, 
as positive acceptance by the population is necessary to 
continue research and innovation in this field.  
Hallucinatory Meaning Overload 
In this article we intend to concentrate especially on points 
2 and 5, namely the objectification and deception of the 
user by the CR. We argue that: 
1) These two points should be considered as ethical issues 
directly raised by the robotics, which will bring substantial 
changes in our way of considering intersubjective relations. 
2) Deception accusation, as it is formulated, lacks the tar-
get because it sublimates human intersubjective relations, 
creating a false polarization between human-human and 
human-robot interactions, where the former is true and the 
latter is false. 
3) The risk of objectification of the elderly should overturn 
in the risk of indiscriminate subjectification of the objec-
tive world, which could produce a hallucinatory reality. 
4) The hallucinatory use of objects by humans is not new, 
but the verbal, empathic and linguistic responsiveness of 
CRs produces an essential change in the hallucinatory sub-
jectivation process of the object. 
5) The root of this problem arises from a fundamental and 
still unbridgeable difference between human-human and 
human-robot relations: the absence, in the robot, of a 
meaning horizon. 
Deception accusation is the objection that more than any-
thing else is raised against CRs (Stahl and Coeckelbergh 
2016), (Whitby 2008), (Sharkey and Sharkey 2006). The 
charge is: even though the robot can simulate an emotional 
state, relate verbally, and thus cause an emotional attach-
ment from the human subject, all these robot’s behaviors 
do not come from a real mental state, from a genuine emo-
tional affect, but only from an algorithm that orders its be-
havior. The fact that the positive aspects of a CR, namely 
the greater possibility of interaction of the elderly, are 
based on a deception would, according to Sparrow (2006) 
and other, make CRs non-ethical: "What most of us want 
out of life is to be loved and cared for, and to have friends 
and companions, not just to believe that we are loved and 
cared for, and to believe that we have friends and compan-
ions, when in fact these beliefs are false". 
Sparrow's words underline a radical difference between the 
robotic relation, where "care" is simulated and is therefore 
false, and the human relation, where the relation is not 
simulated and therefore "true”. In fact, the separation be-
tween false and true is much slimmer, since in any human-
human relation or social interaction there is performativity 
of the relational behavior. That is, in our relations many 
attitudes and behaviors are coded by social rituals, reli-
gious secularized tradition, recurring forms of behavior; 
elements that escape our will, but define the nature of 
much of our interactions. The fact that our behavior is ex-
tremely overstructured by a set of meanings, that we nei-
ther understand nor control but yet practice, is an acquired 
result of cultural anthropology, philosophy and psychoa-
nalysis. Cultural differences, and hence the difference in 
the horizons of meaning shared in a community, determine 
a huge part of what we consider to be right and wrong in 
an interaction. In a society that gives significant im-
portance to family, a subject who cares about an elder 
could be considered an example of deception? Probably 
this question would be opposed by considering that the 
person who cares the elder, because influenced by social 
norms, is not in itself conscious of this and so his action is 
"genuine". We should conclude that what produces a de-
ceptive caring is the consciousness of the extrinsic causa-
tion of the emotional state that leads us to care-giving. But 
this would mean that what makes us ethical in our behav-
iors is the ignorance that these are influenced by a horizon 
of cultural significance. Among other things, if we keep 
the idea that deception is mainly derived from the con-
sciousness that our behavior is overstructured, the robot 
could not be accused of deceiving, in fact it is not aware of 
its behavior. 
Obviously, all those who advance the accusation of decep-
tion would not agree with these consequences. But it seems 
impossible to keep the deception objection for the robots 
without falling in contradiction. If we accept, as it is rea-
sonable, that human behaviors are always to some extent 
influenced by external elements that escape our immediate 
understanding as: unconscious reasons, cultural norms, 
survival of religious elements in civil practices, we must 
also accept that human relations themselves are based on a 
form of deceit. Indeed, one can argue that deceit is due to 
the consciousness of heterogeneity of the causes of our be-
havior, but one would say that the only ethical behavior is 
the ignorance of one's own causes, as seen above. 
Or it can be argued that robotic behavior is false, because it 
is programmed, giving the feeling of total absence of spon-
taneity, but this presupposes that human behavior is spon-
taneous. In fact, we cannot in any way demonstrate that 
human behavior differs in this from the robotic one, be-
cause the elements to consider for explaining human be-
havior are almost infinite: psychological, environmental, 
physical, etc. You cannot put anybody twice in the same 
situation, to see if he would behave differently. We claim 
that human behavior is spontaneous, in the sense of "free 
from external normative influences" without having any 
evidence. We can say that it is precisely the unknowability 
of this aspect which makes us perceive the behavior of 
humans as free. But then we are talking about the complex-
ity of interaction: if a robot, when deciding its action, could 
takes such a large number of contextual elements as a hu-
man, then the same feeling of spontaneity would be per-
ceived. 
Third, one can deny that human behavior is influenced by 
external elements and could oppose to a fully hetero-
generated robotic behavior a completely endo-generated 
human one: the set of affections that lead us to the caring 
of another person are true if and only if they are deter-
mined exclusively by our emotion towards this person, and 
this emotion does not come from causes outside the rela-
tion itself. This thesis seems to be hard to support. First, to 
argue that human behavior is by no means hetero-
generated goes against all psychoanalysis and mass psy-
chology, cultural anthropology, and the philosophy of the 
last century. Secondly, it would be a fallacious argument of 
the kind obscurum per obscurius: what makes human car-
ing "true" is the emotions, which are true because they are 
not further questionable in the causes.  
The deception objection brought to CR is based on the op-
position of human-human and human-machine relations as 
the former of "true" caring and the latter of "false" caring. 
The underlying assumption of this opposition is that there 
is a pure form of human relation, free from deceptive as-
pects, that provides a measurement meter of the falsity of 
the human-robot relation. But this pure form of relation 
does not exist, because each interaction is always loaded 
with a vast set of elements that over-signify the relation 
and affect the behavior of the subject by external causes. A 
trivial example: a woman is extremely attached to an elder-
ly person. She cares for her while not being related to kin-
ship, but the elderly lady in question is very much like the 
woman's dead mother, in appearance and behaviors. The 
behavior of the spontaneous care-giving is therefore 
strongly influenced by this psychological aspect. Is not this 
an example of deception like the robotic one? She does not 
really care for the elder woman, she is only remembering 
her mother.  
Each human relation is to some extent influenced by as-
pects outside the intersubjective relation itself. The accusa-
tion of deception for CRs therefore relies on a false as-
sumption: that relations between humans are to some ex-
tent "true" since care-giving is due to an unselfish attention 
to the other subject. But this attention is not unselfish at all, 
in fact it extremely objectifies the other subject of relation. 
The care-giving action, to a certain extent, fulfills desires 
that are completely external to the relation itself. In this 
sense, we must turn the deception charge against humans, 
instead of CRs: humans act for reasons entirely different 
from "true caring". 
Here obviously we do not want to extend to human the de-
ception objection, but we want to show that this charge 
against robots is based on a misunderstanding and a subli-
mation of human purpose in behaving.  
So, regarding the deception objection moved from Sparrow 
and others we can conclude that: 
- It is based on an implicit assumption that sublimates in-
tersubjective relations between humans, considering these 
relations as "pure" and lacking any degree of deceit. 
- It establishes, without justification, the place to measure 
the ethicality of relational behavior on the subject's intent 
rather than on its effect. 
- It presupposes a surreptitious and sublimated subjectivity 
emptied of all the unconscious, cultural and normative as-
pects that determine the behavior of a subject. 
- It does not consider to any extent the self-deception 
movement operated by the subject (Coeckelbergh 2010) 
From the above, we conclude that human relations are to a 
certain extent influenced by factors external to the two sub-
jects of the relation, and to the relation itself. We will call 
the "overload of meaning" the process in which: a subject 
“A”, in a relation, places on an object or another subject 
“B” a set of meanings, wholly independent of “B” and the 
relation between “A” and “B”, and for “B” not significant. 
These meanings are meaningful only for the author of the 
overload. Often this overload is due to a cultural reason: to 
match the idea of sexuality with an intense sense of guilt is 
a typical consequence of the religiosity of the last century. 
This overload of the meaning of the object can also be seen 
in (Turkle 2006): during an interview with an elder who 
had received a CR, he said he considers the robot as his ex-
wife and treat it as if it was her. The process of overloading 
meaning on an object can become, as in this case, a sort of 
hallucination. 
For "hallucination" we mean here only the process where a 
subject adds meaning to another subject (or object) of the 
relation, that is external to it. 
Trying to figure out how the relation can be overloaded we 
propose three ways: 
- Psychological: the object of the relation becomes the sig-
nifier of psychological meanings. 
- Cultural: Overload is based on the horizon of cultural 
sense of the subject as a result of the legal, moral, reli-
gious, historical, etc. normative constructions. 
- Experiential: the subject carries his/her experiences into 
the relation, modifying judgment on objects and subjects 
based on past experiences. 
We distinguished between "object" relations, those that in-
clude a human subject and an inanimate object, and "inter-
subjective" relations, which include two interacting sub-
jects of some kind. The first difference between the two is 
that in the object relation there is no resistance to the over-
load of meaning, while in the subjective relations there is 
some. To return to Turkle, the elder who over-signified the 
small robot as it was the ex-wife, found no resistance from 
the robot to this projection; a human subject would certain-
ly have resisted to some extent to this. The second differ-
ence is that object relations offer to the subject a limited 
number of interactions, as an inanimate body does not take 
any initiative, and the quality of this interaction is repeti-
tive. In short: we get easily bored of objects. Other human 
beings, on the contrary, offer numerically superior and 
qualitatively better interactions. 
Robotic is advancing rapidly to bridge the existing distance 
between objective and intersubjective relations with regard 
to quality and number of interactions: the perfect Compan-
ion Robot would be able to provide a number and a quality 
of interactions equal to, or even bigger than, a human. 
However, what is not yet considered is the first gap, name-
ly: to what extent a CR should accept to be meaning over-
loaded by a human? Our thesis is that the real threat CRs 
will bring to relations is not to "deceive" the subject, but to 
bring healthy subjects to gradually detach themselves from 
a balanced and "healthy" relationality in favor of a halluci-
natory intersubjectivity. 
The robot, in fact, appears to be the perfect hallucinatory 
object as it provides the maximum relational ability, as a 
human, and the minimal resistance to objectification. 
Therefore, we should consider the danger that, in a future 
where CRs really have a relational ability comparable to 
the human one, humans will start to prefer the friendship of 
robots instead of a human one, as Turkle (2006) argues. In 
fact, the robot not only interacts like a human, but does it 
every time the human wants and stops when he wants. In 
addition, the robot does not withstand to a meaning-
overload as a human would. 
 
From Quasi-Otherness to Quasi-Sameness 
To define the role of the robot in the intersubjective rela-
tion, Coeckelbergh (2011) uses the notion of "quasi-other" 
He opposes the robot as "quasi-other" to robot as a simple 
machine, arguing that the difference between the two relies 
basically on a linguistic device. The quasi-subjectivity or 
the reduction of the robot to a simple machine is a linguis-
tic device. Some considerations can be added to Coeckel-
bergh “quasi-other” definition. The robot is "quasi-other" 
because of its simultaneous being object and subject within 
the relation with the human. It puts in question the limits 
between objectivity and subjectivity. "Quasi-other" is at 
the same time something that exceeds its objectual nature, 
and a subject missing a crucial aspect of subjectivity. In 
each of the two cases the robot is located in a border area, 
where its definition always refers to an excess or a defi-
ciency, an imbalance. It is therefore necessary to ask what 
the robot exceeds in objectivity, and what is lacking in be-
ing subject. While it is rather simple to define how the CR 
exceeds objectivity, that is entertaining an intersubjective 
relation with humans, less clearly one can identify what 
characterizes it as a missing subject. In fact, it is not 
enough for CR to simulate the relational behavior of hu-
mans, it remains a “quasi-other” and it does not reach a 
complete subjectivity. According to Coeckelbergh, the 
"quasi-other" nature of a robot is a linguistic construction 
that takes place within the generative processes of meaning 
of the normative structures of language. He points out two 
basic factors for the definition of the robot as a “quasi-
other”: the first is the robot's responsiveness to relational 
stimuli, which allows the robot to entertain a conversation, 
the second is the use, to address the robot, of the linguistic 
form "you": When the robot becomes a "you", it slips lin-
guistically from objectivity to quasi-subjectivity. 
According to the distinction above, we could say that ver-
bal and relational responsiveness defines the content of the 
object's excess, while subjectivity is ensured by the linguis-
tic normativity of the linguistically built “you” for the ro-
bot. 
 But Coeckelbergh does not address a second challenge 
that comes from the notion of "quasi-other": why does the 
linguistic construction of the robot as a subject not seem to 
be stable like the construction of any other subject? It 
seems that the robot, even if theoretically capable of per-
forming all human behaviors in the same way as a human, 
cannot overcome its "quasi-other" nature and reach the 
state of a fully "otherness". We think an answer to this 
question can be found in the Freudian notion of “perturb-
ing” or “uncanny”. We are interested in using this term in 
the German meaning of "Un-heimlich", which translates to 
un-familiar. What is uncanny, for Freud, is basically some-
thing that is in an area of contradiction between the famil-
iar and the stranger: something stranger that turns out to be 
all at once familiar, or vice versa. The uncanny effect orig-
inates in literature mainly from stories that have as central 
theme the sosia or the automata. From these two it is clear 
how this sensation originates, in particular from narratives 
that collapse the demarcation line between subjectivity and 
objectivity: the sosia is for Freud a copy of the self that re-
calls the possibility of death and reduction to objectivity; 
the machine produces an uncanny effect in a situation 
where one is unable to clearly identify whether the other is 
a human or an automaton. 
The two main lines of uncanny can thus be identified in the 
pair of foreign-familiar and subject-object oppositions. 
The “uncanny valley” theory argues (Pollick 2010) that the 
perturbing sensation originates in an area where the robot 
has a very strong resemblance to human, being but not yet 
complete. Freud would also subscribe to this assertion, as 
the disturbing machine in Freud is exactly what goes be-
yond human behaviors to be just a machine, but it is still 
too deficient to be called "human." The perturbing effect 
fades away if the robot does not look similar enough to a 
human being, or if this resemblance is total. For a physical 
and visual interaction, the uncanny feeling ceases when the 
robot makes its movements as fluid as humans. For what 
concerns interaction with CRs, the need is also to simulate 
a human-like linguistic interaction. In fact, a CR would 
have a considerable number of interactions with the human 
subject, of various kinds and within a prolonged period. 
The challenge, then, is not to build an intelligence that can 
manage a single human-like conversation; the goal is to 
build a machine capable of entertaining any kind of con-
versation, building a memory of previous conversations to 
learn the communicative modalities of the human subject 
and bring the interaction to a deeper level. This must be 
done in the same way as humans do: diversifying interper-
sonal approaches based on multiple factors, as the 
knowledge of the other person and hence his "horizon of 
meaning." For example, if Alfredo talks to two of his 
friends and both say “I'm depressed," Alfredo diversifies 
the meaning of the word "depressed", based on previous 
interactions with his two friends. One of them might have a 
clinical history of depression, the other might be simply 
speaking about a moment of sadness. The robot must like-
wise become capable of this diversification of meaning and 
this will only be possible by "learning" the other’s horizon 
of meaning that, as we have seen before, is the result of the 
interaction of subjective (psychological and experiential) 
and external (cultural contexts) elements. The greatest dif-
ficulty will be to understand in what way, for a particular 
individual, the set of culturally normative aspects meet 
with the personal history of the individual, and create a 
specific sense horizon. From this point of view, a CR 
should not only have the ability to penetrate into the behav-
ior of human subjects, but also to put this behavior into a 
meaningful cultural context. But this is not the only ability 
the robot has to gain, to actually match a human from the 
point of relational effectiveness. In fact, every human is 
not only able to fit within the horizon of meanings of other 
people, but he/she carries his own. 
For these reasons, we believe that the uncanny sensation 
will be produced by CRs by two fundamental aspects. 
First, the absence of an autonomous horizon of meaning. 
Second, the universal and abstract cause of the robot’s ac-
tions. During any dialogical relation with another human, it 
is assumed that in front of the phrase "I fell in love", the 
other person is able to give not only a syntactic meaning to 
the sentence. We assume that it produces a mental state in 
him that attributes to "in love" a set of feelings, emotions 
and reasonings. These differ for a certain measure from 
those of the speaking subject, generating a semantic gap 
from the same word. This difference in the attribution of 
meaning originates from the set of cultural conditioning, 
psychological aspects, and the experiences of the other 
subject, and gives us the feeling that we are talking with 
another particular subject, carrying his/her own and unre-
peatable meanings. This also means that when the other 
subject speaks, he is proposing a re-elaboration of the ele-
ments of the discourse coming from his semantic field, 
constantly making in fieri the meaning of the speech. The 
significance of a signifier is consistently "unstable" during 
dialogue by continuous re-meaning that takes place within 
the semantic field of the two speaking subjects. In contrast, 
robots do not provide this feeling of interacting with an-
other subject. 
When Orelia, a girl who is entrusted with the robot AIBO 
(Turkle 2006), is asked if the robot can love her and if she 
can love it, the little girl replies that the robot cannot love 
her, at most it can be programmed to show love, but surely 
she cannot love something that does not reciprocate. 
Here we can find both the differences that characterize the 
human-human relation from the human-robot relation: for 
the little girl the robot can perform loving behavior but 
cannot love. Loving behavior does not have any autono-
mous meaning for the robot, it is a significant behavior on-
ly for the human, and hence "They will not love you if you 
love them." The absence of a robot's autonomous horizon 
of meaning, that makes its behavior significant, is the first 
element of Orelia mistrusts. The second is the fact that 
programming is needed for the robot to perform a certain 
behavior. The fact that robot acts in a-priori way, not re-
garding the particularity of the interaction, makes the ma-
chine a universal abstract, opposed to human being, whose 
behavior is always contextualized. Also, if the robot acts 
stochastically, the resulting behavior is not perceived by 
human as spontaneous and interested about the interaction. 
We mean: if the robot says “I love you”, I know that he is 
not loving me, but he is programmed to say “I love you”. 
These words mean nothing for it. The CR, in the intersub-
jective relation, becomes for the human a semantic mirror: 
he does not produce an autonomous horizon to signify 
words and actions, outside the one produced by the human 
subject. Even though assuming a CR capable of diversify-
ing the sense of words and experiences, based on the hori-
zon of meanings of the human subject it interacts with, it 
could not nevertheless generate its own. That would be the 
only way to give humans the feeling of actually dealing 
with a subject. It could be argued that the robot, if able to 
learn the horizon of meaning of a human, would have a 
way of signifying the words and experiences "mimetic" 
with respect to that of that human subject. We believe that 
this is even more risky: if the robot assumes this mimetic 
pose, it definitely becomes a mirror of the subject. As we 
said before, this would lead to an unlimited extension of 
the hallucinatory overload on the robot. To return to the 
elder projecting the ex-wife on robot, in this case a CR 
would not only passively assume this role, but would ac-
tively perform behaviors associated with the hallucinatory 
overload of the human subject. That would lead users to an 
even more serious alienation in relations and would create 
a world tailored to their hallucinations. The situation would 
not improve even if CRs had the opportunity to draw a 
common network of intersubjective experiences and build 
a kind of "robotic shared subjectivity": this would be a 
universal subjectivity detached from the experience of a 
specific robot and thus seen as procedural and universalis-
tic, as for Orelia, who argues that the robot is programmed 
to love and cannot truly be in love.  
Going back to the “uncanny” theme, we believe that this 
sensation is basically generated by the two elements dis-
cussed above: the lack of a robot's own horizon of meaning 
and the feeling that its behavior is a disembodied universal. 
First, the uncanny sensation is generated by having to deal 
with an externalized self-mirror: this resumes precisely the 
Freudian definition of Un-heimlich: the contemporaneity 
of familiarity, human’s own horizon of meaning, and for-
eignness, the fact that it is mimed by the robot. Secondly, it 
is uncanny the awareness that the robot acts in a disembod-
ied way: this is because of the contradiction between an 
intersubjective relation that is perceived as a relation be-
tween two individualities, and the abstract and disembod-
ied nature of the robotic act, where behaviors are perceived 
as determined a-priori. The robot is, in this regard, more an 
“almost-the-same”, than a “quasi-other” compared to the 
subject: it is absent in him the ability to generate a universe 
of meanings for words and experiences, so he takes a hu-
man one. To sum up, the definition of CR as uncanny 
comes from “quasi-otherness” in two ways: first, it is a 
quasi-subject, namely it lies on the boundary between sub-
jectivity and objectivity. Secondly, it is simultaneously a 
quasi-me/another-from-me: a subject-object reflecting the 
human horizon of meanings. This makes robot interactions 
uncanny in two ways: first, the CR, like Freud's automata, 
questions the difference between alive and dead, subjective 
and objective, particular and universal. Secondly, mirror-
ing the human it produces the contemporaneity of a famili-
arity and foreignness.  
 
 
Conclusions 
The risk of creating a hallucinatory reality for humans in 
human-robot interactions is something which deserves an 
in-depth investigation. This does not mean that CR should 
be regarded as a threat to humans and society, but it is nec-
essary to build human-robot interactions in such a way to 
ensure keeping the human subject psychologically healthy. 
We have illustrated that the difference between humans 
and robots relies in the human ability to make the semantic 
gap between two horizons of meaning fruitful. Conse-
quently, to avoid a hallucinatory result, the challenge is to 
simulate this mechanism in robots. We are currently at-
tempting a new theoretical paradigm that uses Lacanian 
theory of Das Ding (Lacan 1959) to design a healthier 
management of human-robot interaction. 
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